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AFFAIPS AN TmE CONSTITUnON, Louis Henkin. Mineola, New
York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. xi, 553.
During the early years of this Republic the study of American
constitutional law tended to include, as its integral part, the constitutional law of American foreign policy. This invariably meant that the
student of American constitutional law devoted a part of his academic
research to the related questions of the constitutional regulation of the
foreign policy making processes.
But as the discipline became more sophisticated and its subject
matter more intricate, as the foreign policy making process itself grew
to include many intangibles and political considerations began to
play an ever-increasing role in the shaping of that policy, it became
increasingly clear that U.S. foreign relations can no longer be subjected to the meticulous constitutional regulation that had come to
surround the various domestic aspects of our constitutional system.
This resulted in an undesirable compartmentalization of constitutional
law into "pure" constitutional law (i.e., the constitutional law of
domestic relations) and external constitutional law. The result of
this was that the pure constitutional lawyer felt "unqualified" to
discuss the questions of foreign policy and the foreign relations of
the United States while on the other hand the international lawyer
moved away from any in-depth examination of the constitutional
foundations of the powers of the executive department in the conduct
of foreign relations.
At the losing end of this process was the student. The average
student of American constitutional law knows that there are provisions
in the U.S. Constitution regulating the behavior of the President on
the international scene but he cannot tell you much about them. A
traditional course in constitutional law in an average American law
school would tend to leave off the sections of the course dealing with
foreign policy regulations with the hope that the class in public international law will fill in the gap. But for a combination of reasons this
gap filling never takes place.
This "passing of the buck" between teachers of constitutional and
international law has for a long time created some uneasiness among
research scholars. Professor Louis Henkin has finally decided to do
something about it and his book, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution,
is a very timely relief.' This book is perhaps the most successful
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1 There have been other attempts in the past to focus attention in the constitutional regulation of foreign policy. Among such works are: E. CORwiN, THE

PaEsmaENr, OFFICE AND POWES 1787-1957 (4th ed. 1957); W. WILLOUGHBY,
PRIn PLES OF CONSrrrtrnONAL LAw OF THE UrTx

STATES (2nd ed. 1929); Q.

WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AmEnIcAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922).
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bridgebuilder between what one might call the domestic and the
external aspects of U.S. constitutional law.
In an eleven chapter essay the author discusses such wide-ranging
topics as the constitutional authority of the federal government, the
distribution of political power between Congress and the President,
the constitutional law of international cooperation, federal judicial
power over foreign affairs matters and the various limits imposed by
the Constitution on the powers of' the President as the sole organ
charged with the conduct of overall U.S. foreign relations.
In matters of domestic policy the three departments of the federal
government are separate but equal. In matters of foreign policy, however, it appears at first glance that these three departments are integrated into one-the Executive Department as the "sole organ". In
the United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. decision,2 the U.S.
Supreme Court spoke of "the very delicate plenary and exclusive power
of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations." Thus "[f]rom the beginning the
President has been the organ of communication with foreign governments and had control of the channels of information-the voice as
well as the ears of the United States."
The near absolute consolidation of all federal powers in one department of government in matters of foreign affairs is more apparent
than it is real. The author in a most brilliant fashion discusses the
theories and the realities of the U.S. foreign policy making processes.
For most of the foreign affairs powers of the President there is a
residual check available to Congress. It is true that Congress does not
always avail itself of this opportunity to intervene in matters of
foreign policy. The President has, therefore, progressively built up
what have come to be known as his foreign affairs powers and his war
powers.
The so-called foreign affairs powers which were asserted by the
President and acquiesced in by the other departments of the federal
government "have come to describe a constitutional 'power', supplementing if not subsuming those specified, supporting a variety of
Presidential actions not expressly authorized by the Constitution."
In fact, under the "sole organ" doctrine the President can do anything
he considers necessary and proper to further the foreign policy goals
of the United States so long as such power is not specifically denied
him under the Constitution. The result of these unilateral assertions
of power by the President is that in the area of foreign policy the
2299 U.S. 804, 320 (1936).
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office of the President progressively grows fatter while the other two
departments grow thinner.
At the moment the only meaningful controls that Congress has over
the President in the making of foreign policy include the power of the
purse, the power to legislatively override the President on any matters
of foreign policy with which it disagrees and the power to deny its
consent to any U.S. treaty-in-making.
On the other hand the courts in an effort not to "embarrass" the
Executive Department in the latter's conduct of U.S. foreign policy
have almost completely abdicated their judicial powers on matters of
foreign relations of the United States. It is true, of course, as Professor
Henkin points out in chapter 8 of his book, that the courts have been
more willing to judicially legislate in some areas of foreign policy than
they are in other areas.
To the extent that the author sought to provide a supplementary
reading material for students of constitutional law and international
law it is my opinion that that objective has been very successfully
achieved. The book is very well researched, the issues raised are very
current ones and on the whole Professor Henkin has no doubt produced one of the best essays of our time on the external constitutional
law of the United States de lega lata.
Looking at the book, however, from another perspective one cannot
but say that it left out yet another aspect of the constitutional law of
U.S. foreign relations which is of equal currency-the question of the
urgent need to constitutionally re-define the scope of presidential
prerogative in the conduct of the foreign relations of this republic.
Admittedly such a discussion would be de lege ferenda but it is
certainly not out of place for a book of the stature of Professor Henkin's
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution to come up with proposals for
curtailing some of the excesses of the Chief Executive in the area of
foreign policy.
As it now stands too much discretion is vested in the President in
foreign affairs matters and the urgent task now is for students of
constitutional law, international, and possibly administrative law to
team together to define, structure, and confine this presidential discretion. Ours is still a government of laws and of men and there is no
reason why this cannot apply, mutatis mutandis, to the conduct of our
foreign relations. The conduct of U.S. foreign policy is recognized to
lie within the President's exclusive domain: he alone and without
the advice and consent of Congress shall decide whether to recognize
a new state or government, to appoint and recall U.S. ambassadors,
to enter into talks with foreign governments, to sign executive agree-
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ments, to determine the general principles of U.S. participation in
various international organizations, etc. This authority has been said
to be expressly enumerated in the clause vesting the executive power
on the President.
In all of these actions the President exercises almost absolute discretion. Thus whereas the executive department is a co-equal branch
of our government in matters of domestic affairs, it is unquestionably
the only authority that conducts our foreign affairs. Certainly the
founding fathers did not intend to make the President a "czar" in the
area of foreign policy.
It is equally true that the entire area of foreign policy is not
amenable to any detailed legal regulation and as such some measure
of discretion should be left to the "sole organ" charged with the conduct of such policy. But if that discretion is not to be abused by the
Chief Executive, it should be structured, defined and confined. Whether
through legislative or executive guidelines, some method should be
found for placing reasonable checks on the presently uncontrolled
authority of one department of government to run the entire foreign
relations of this Republic.
By the same token, while accepting the argument that foreign
relations are political relations to be conducted only by the political
department of the federal government and that as such the courts
should not interfere unless substantial constitutional law questions are
involved, it is submitted that a way could be found in which the
courts can get more involved by acting as a brake over the excesses
of the executive department in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.
After all, the judiciary is still "the least dangerous branch" and its
power lies essentially in its being able to supply a judicial brake to the
motive power of the two political branches.
In attempting to confine the discretion of the Chief Executive in
the area of foreign policy, constitutional lawyers cannot be closed-eyed
to what is happening in some other areas of American public law. Administrative agencies possess quite some discretion both under their
various enabling statutes and under the Administrative Procedure Act.4
But at least some effort, though not always as successful as one would
expect, was made to place some legal checks on these agencies. In
this regard the provisions of Sections 701 and 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act on the scope of review of the actions of administrative
3

Alexander Hamilton's phrase popularized by Professor Alexander Bickel in

THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).

4Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 287 (1946); U.S.C. Title 5.
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agencies by the courts can be instructive. Under Section 701, para.
a(2) an action committed to the discretion of an agency by law cannot
be reviewed by courts except if, under Section 706, it is shown that
the agency grossly abused that discretion or behaved in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. The determination of what constitutes abuse
of discretion is a matter for the courts.
There is no inherent reason why the U.S. Supreme Court could
not be granted the same power of review over some of the capricious
and arbitrary actions of the President in foreign affairs matters particularly if such actions do not in any meaningful way promote the
national interests of the Republic.
Professor Henkin discusses some of the many problems facing
judicial review of the conduct of foreign policy. I would tend to
agree with the author's position on all of those problems, but the
central point to be borne in mind is that the principle of "political
question" is a judicial creation and the Supreme Court, if it so
chooses, may modify that doctrine to permit it to review any arbitrary
and capricious move that the President may make in the area of
foreign relations. Such a modification would only be a rejection of the
extravagant version of the principle of non-justiciability, and the entire
constitutional system would be better off for it. To argue that such a
move on the part of the Supreme Court would be embarrassing to the
Chief Executive is not sufficiently convincing.
The Constitution of the United States created three equal departments of the federal government without spelling out in much detail
their powers in the area of foreign relations. What has come to be
known today as the President's "foreign affairs powers" or "executive
powers" or "war making powers" are all a result of progressive and
unilateral executive assertions with the benign acquiescence of the
other two departments. All of this can be undone without necessarily
depriving the President of the much needed discretion in the conduct
of our foreign relations, and it will need no constitutional amendment
to do so.
The discretionary powers of the President in foreign affairs must
be confined, structured, and checked. Most political questions have
constitutional underpinnings and therefore are amenable to judicial
legislation. Professor Henkin shared this concern when he wrote: "In
a nation turning inward to face deep domestic problems the old constitutional assumptions that foreign affairs are different and special
may not survive unexamined." The time is overdue for their re-
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examination: the courts should speak out and Congress should begin
to reassert some of its long abdicated authority in the sphere of foreign
affairs.
Christopher Osakwe*
Asst. Professor of Law, Tulane University. LL.M., 1967; Ph.D., 1970,
Moscow State University.

